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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Robert Scott Macklin appeals from the district court’s order denying his petition for postconviction relief following an evidentiary hearing.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The Idaho Court of Appeals described the facts and proceedings in Macklin’s underlying
criminal case as follows:
Robert Scott Macklin pled guilty to grand theft, Idaho Code §§ 18-2403(1),
18-2407(1)(b)(1), 18-2408. The district court imposed a five-year determinate
term, suspended the sentence, and placed Macklin on probation for four years.
Subsequently, Macklin admitted to violating the terms of the probation, and the
district court consequently revoked probation and ordered execution of the original
sentence. Macklin filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction of
sentence, which the district court denied. Macklin appealed, and this Court
affirmed the district court’s orders revoking probation and denying Macklin’s Rule
35 motion. State v. Macklin, Docket No. 43623 (Ct. App. June 16, 2016)
(unpublished).
State v. Macklin, Docket No. 46661 (Ct. App. October 16, 2019) (unpublished).
Macklin filed a petition for post-conviction relief which was granted in November of 2017.
(R., p.46 n.1. 1) As a result of the post-conviction action, the district court vacated the September
16, 2015, order revoking Macklin’s probation and, following a new disposition hearing, continued
Macklin on probation with the condition that he successfully complete drug court. (R., pp.46-48.)
Macklin was released from jail on January 31, 2018, and was ordered to report to drug court on
February 1, 2018. (R., pp.52-54.) Macklin was terminated from drug court on July 19, 2018. (R.,
pp.56-57.) That same day, the state filed a motion to revoke Macklin’s probation, alleging he had
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The district court took judicial notice of the Clerk’s Record and Transcript in “Idaho Appellate
Docket Number 46661[,]” which was made a part of the Clerk’s Record of this appeal. (Tr., p.9,
Ls.5-10; see generally R., pp.20-130.)
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violated the conditions of his probation by failing to successfully complete drug court and by
residing in a location where firearms were present. (R., pp.58-73.) “A conflict Public Defender
(Dan Brown) was appointed to replace the Twin Falls County Public Defender’s office on October
11, 2018.” (R., p.160; see id., pp.82-86.) Macklin admitted to violating the terms of his probation
by failing to successfully complete drug court and, on November 27, 2018, the district court
revoked his probation and executed his underlying sentence. (R., pp.88-92.) Macklin filed a Rule
35 motion for reconsideration of his sentence, which was denied. (R., pp.93-105.) Macklin
appealed (R., pp.106-109), and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s revocation
of his probation and imposition of sentence. Macklin, Docket No. 46661.
On June 13, 2019, Macklin filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief with a
supporting affidavit claiming his conflict Public Defender, Dan Brown, was ineffective in several
ways. (R., pp.7-15.) The state file an Answer (R., pp.16-19), and Macklin, through appointed
counsel, filed an Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (“Amended Petition”)
presenting three claims, including ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to contest his
termination from drug court as provided by State v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738, 170 P.3d 881 (2007)
(R., pp.131-138). The state filed a Motion to Stay or Dismiss as Premature and State’s Answer to
the Amended Petition. (R., pp.139-143.) On May 8, 2020, the district court held an evidentiary
hearing during which six people testified. (See generally Tr.) After the evidentiary hearing,
Macklin filed a Post-Evidentiary Brief (R., pp.144-154), and the district court subsequently entered
a Memorandum Decision Denying Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and Judgment, denying
Macklin post-conviction relief. (R., pp.155-168.) Macklin timely appealed. (R, pp.169-171.)
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ISSUES
Macklin states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Macklin’s petition for postconviction relief based on his allegation that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to contest his termination
from drug court?

II.

Alternatively, did the district court err in concluding that Mr. Macklin’s
testimony regarding what he learned in drug court was not relevant to his
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel?

(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1. Has Macklin failed to show error in the district court’s denial of his post-conviction claim that
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to contest his termination from drug court?
2. Has Macklin failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by ruling that what Macklin
learned in drug court was not relevant to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Macklin Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Denial Of His Post-Conviction Claim
That His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Contest His Termination From Drug
Court
A.

Introduction
Macklin argues that the district court erred by denying him post-conviction relief on his

claim that his trial counsel, Dan Brown, failed to contest his termination from drug court by not
requesting a hearing pursuant to State v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738, 170 P.3d 881 (2007). (Appellant’s
brief, pp.6-12.) Macklin’s argument fails.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Applications for post-conviction relief under the UPCPA initiate civil proceedings in

which, like a civil plaintiff, the applicant must prove his or her allegations by a preponderance of
the evidence.” McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010) (citing Hauschulz
v. State, 144 Idaho 834, 838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007); I.C.R. 57(c)).
When the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters findings of fact and
conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they are clearly
erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the district court from those
facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998). A trial court’s
decision that a post-conviction petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled to great weight.
Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990). The credibility of the
witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the
evidence are all matters solely within the province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139
Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003).
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C.

Standards Relevant To Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-conviction petitioner

must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989).
With respect to the deficient performance prong, the United States Supreme Court has articulated
the defendant’s burden under Strickland as follows:
To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a conviction must show
that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. A
court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must apply a strong presumption
that counsel’s representation was within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance. The challenger’s burden is to show that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011) (citations and quotations omitted).
In State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 417-418, 348 P.3d 1, 32-33 (2015), the Idaho Supreme
Court further explained:
The defendant also must overcome a strong presumption “that counsel
‘made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional
judgment.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, . . . 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1407 . . . (2011) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 . . .). “A fair assessment of attorney performance
requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the
conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 . . . .
Thus, strategic decisions are “virtually unchallengeable” if made after a “thorough
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options.” Id. at 690 . . . .
Decisions “made after less than complete investigation” are still reasonable to the
extent “reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on
investigation.” Id. at 691 . . . . Counsel is permitted to develop a strategy[.] Richter,
562 U.S. at 107 . . .
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.
Richter, 562 U.S. at 104. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
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confidence in the outcome.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). “It is not enough to show that
the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. Rather, “[c]ounsel’s
errors must be so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”
Id.
When a post-conviction petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
motion, “the district court may consider the probability of success of the motion in question in
determining whether the attorney’s inactivity constituted incompetent performance.” Wolf v.
State, 152 Idaho 64, 67, 266 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Boman v. State, 129 Idaho
520, 526, 927 P.2d 910, 916 (Ct. App. 1996)). “Where the alleged deficiency is counsel’s failure
to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the trial
court, is generally determinative of both prongs of the Strickland test.” Id. at 67-68, 266 P.3d at
1172-73.
D.

The District Court Correctly Determined That Macklin’s Trial Counsel Was Not
Ineffective For Not Challenging Macklin’s Termination From Drug Court
For its response to Macklin’s arguments, the state relies upon, and incorporates as if fully

set forth herein, the district court’s Memorandum Decision Denying Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief (R., pp.155-166), which is attached to this brief as Appendix A. In addition to the court’s
analysis and conclusions, the state makes the following arguments in support of the court’s
decision and order.
1.

Deficient Performance

In denying Macklin’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a
Rogers hearing to challenge Macklin’s termination from drug court, the district court noted that
Dan Brown “did not substitute in and become Macklin’s attorney until October 11, 2018 – some
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four months[2] after Macklin had been terminated from the program for the alleged rule violations
to which Macklin had already admitted.” (R., p.160.) The court found that Brown’s assistance
was not deficient under Strickland based on (1) Brown’s testimony that he did not believe a Rogers
hearing would be successful, (2) Macklin admitted on the record that he violated Drug Court rules,
(3) a review of Macklin’s file “convinced him that attempting to challenge his dismissal from the
specialty court months after the fact would be fruitless[,]” and (4) he conferred with Macklin before
deciding to forego requesting a Rogers hearing. (R., pp.160-161.) A review of Macklin’s file by
Brown would have revealed that the rules Macklin violated showed his counsel was not deficient
for deciding to forego a Rogers hearing to challenge Macklin’s termination from Drug Court.
At the March 28, 2018, Drug Court hearing, Macklin admitted that he missed his
homework assignment, saying it was “all on me[,]” and received a verbal warning from the court.
(3/28/18 Tr., p.2, Ls.12-25. 3)
On June 27, 2018, one week after Macklin’s partner died from an opioid (suboxone)
overdose, the Drug Court sanctioned Macklin because, even though he had asked for permission
to live with his partner, he represented that his partner’s home was a healthy environment and
transition, without disclosing that his partner was addicted to pain medications. (6/27/18 Tr., p.8,
L.24 – p.10, L.17; 7/18/18 Tr., p.16, Ls.1-13.) Macklin conceded that the court’s assessment that
he had not been honest was “[f]air enough.” (6/27/18 Tr., p.10, Ls.12-17.) Macklin also violated
Drug Court rules by moving next door, from his partner’s house to his partner’s parents’ home,
after his partner overdosed and died, without first obtaining his probation officer’s approval.

2

The time between Macklin’s July 19, 2018, termination from Drug Court (see R., pp.56-57) and
Dan Brown’s appointment as counsel on October 11, 2018, was actually just under three months.
3

The Drug Court transcripts of hearings are located in the file labeled “Supreme Court 481652020 Macklin – Exhibits.pdf.” Page references are according to each transcript’s numbers.
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(6/27/18 Tr., p.11, Ls.10-21.) The court sanctioned Macklin for his rule violations by ordering
him to “write an essay on the importance of honesty in recovery” and to attend Drug Court weekly.
(6/27/18 Tr., p.13, Ls.1-12.)
At the July 18, 2018, Drug Court hearing, Macklin admitted that he missed taking a
urinalysis because he “forgot to call.” (7/18/18 Tr., p.15, Ls.11-19.) The court said it had a lot of
concerns and recapped Macklin’s prior rule violations of failing to disclose his partner’s drug
addiction and moving from his partner’s residence to his partner’s parents’ residence without
authorization. (7/18/18 Tr., p.15, L.20 – p.16, L.20.) The court discussed Macklin’s claim that
he was unaware that his partner’s parents, the McCaslins, had alcohol and firearms in their home;
in response to Macklin’s claim that the alcohol was in the home “before [he] moved in there,” the
court said, “[t]hat wasn’t the case when [the] probation officer went over there to do a house
inspection.” (7/18/18 Tr., p.17, Ls.5-12.) Macklin also denied knowledge that the McCaslins had
firearms in their home. (7/18/18 Tr., p.16, L.25 – p.17, L.4.) Despite Macklin’s claims of
ignorance, the Drug Court judge concluded, “I don’t believe that you didn’t know that there was
firearms. I don’t believe that you didn’t know there’s alcohol consumption[,]” and “this was right
after . . . we … had you do an essay on honesty. I think you’re trying to go through this program
according to your own terms and conditions.” (Tr., p.17, L.20 p.18, L.1.)
The Drug Court judge and Macklin then discussed the allegation that Macklin had left the
judicial district without his probation officer’s approval:
[THE COURT:] Let me ask you this. Have you ever been out of the district
without authorization?
THE DEFENDANT: No, I have not. No, I have not.
THE COURT: You have not been?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
8

THE COURT: You’re looking at me telling me that you have not – you
have not been?
THE DEFENDANT: No, I have not.
friend?

THE COURT: Okay. So you didn’t go fishing in American Falls with your
THE DEFENDANT: No, I did not.
THE COURT: You did not?

THE DEFENDANT: We went in the Snake River Canyon just on the other
side of Burley.
PROBATION OFFICER: Speaking with [Mr. McCaslin] today, Mr.
Macklin’s landlord/roommate, him, Wade, and Scott went to American Falls and
went fishing on June 16th, the day prior to Wade’s death, Your Honor.
THE DEFENDANT: And I believe that’s in that county.
PROBATION OFFICER: American Falls is in district 6.
(7/18/18 Tr., p.18, Ls.2-24 (emphasis added).)
Unimpressed with Macklin’s multiple denials that he had gone fishing in American Falls
with his friend, followed by Macklin’s feeble explanation (“I believe that’s in that county”) when
it became obvious his denials were not credible, the court concluded:
Again, I think you’ve been manipulating me, you’ve been manipulating the team,
trying to go through the program according to your own terms and conditions, made
the decision that it’s not working out in drug court, I’m going to terminate you from
the program.
(7/18/18 Tr., p.18, L.25 - p.19, L.5.)
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Dan Brown, who was appointed as Macklin’s
conflict counsel almost three months after Macklin was terminated from Drug Court, testified that
he did not file a Rogers motion because it would not have been successful. (R., pp.56-57; Tr.,
p.108, Ls.13-19; p.111, Ls.11-15; p.113, Ls.10-12.) Mr. Brown testified that he “informed the
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defendant that [he] did not believe [they] could be successful in contesting [Macklin’s] discharge
from drug court, and [he] believe[d] that [Macklin] agreed with [him].” (Tr., p.120, Ls.4-6.)
Prominent in Mr. Brown’s decision not to challenge Macklin’s Drug Court termination was
the fact that Macklin admitted on the record that he had violated Drug Court rules. (Tr., p.123,
Ls.14-19; p.124, L.24 – p.125, L.2.) When asked which Drug Court terms Macklin admitted
violating, Mr. Brown said,
Several. That he not reside in a place in which alcohol was present; that he
left the district without permission; that he was dishonest with drug court; that he
had missed a drug test. I believe that was most of them, but there could have been
a couple more.
(Tr., p.124, Ls.6-10.)
Mr. Brown recalled “there being a letter of apology to drug court for being dishonest
relative to his residing with Wade, who had a prescription drug addiction.” (Tr., p.109, L.25 –
p.110, L.2.) As to Macklin’s argument that Mr. Ajeti, his felony Drug Court supervisor, would
have allowed him to go to American Falls to fish, Mr. Brown understood that such after-the-fact
justification would not have gone over well with the Drug Court judge, where strict adherence to
the rules is very important. 4 (Tr., p.48, L.2 – p.49, L.7; p.121, Ls.4-10.)

4

After being terminated from Drug Court, Macklin willfully admitted that he was in violation of
his probation, as described by Mr. Brown in the following colloquy:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Right. So ultimately he just pleaded to being terminated from drug court?
Correct.
Voluntarily?
Yes.
Did you strong-arm him into that?
No, I did not.
As you think about it now, did he ever protest to you and say, “Let’s go get
that drug court hearing overturned”?
No.

(Tr., p.120, Ls.12-22.)
10

Based on all the above, the district court was “convinced that Brown made a strategic
decision only after conferring with Macklin[,]” reasonably concluding it could not “find that
Brown’s representation fell below objective standards of competence and Macklin’s current claim
that Brown was ineffective because he failed to request a Rogers hearing does not pass the first
prong of the Strickland test.” 5 (R., p.161 (italics added to “Strickland”).) Macklin has failed to
overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s representation was within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance[,]” and that his counsel “was not functioning as counsel
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104
(2011).
2.

Prejudice

The district court also ruled that Macklin failed to meet his burden of showing prejudice
under Strickland. The court explained:
The witnesses who Macklin claims might have been able to help him dispute the
alleged Drug Court rule violations at a Rogers hearing are the same witnesses he
called to testify at the May 8, 2020 evidentiary hearing in this PCR matter. Their
testimony confirmed that Macklin was violating the rules of the Drug Court
program as alleged. He was living in more than one home on the same property,
bouncing back and forth between them, without the permission of his Probation
Officer. Likewise, it is clear from the witness testimony that he was residing in a
home where alcohol and firearms were located (notwithstanding the explanation
that the items were locked in safe); and he was clearly associating with a person
who was abusing prescription drugs (Wade McCaslin), regardless of the fact Mr.
McCaslin might have had a prescription to possess those substances legally.
(Sadly, Wade McCaslin overdosed on those prescription drugs).

5

The district court also found that “Macklin’s due process rights were sufficiently safeguarded
because he was represented by counsel at the time and he was given the opportunity to refute
and/or explain each alleged rule violation during each of the weekly Drug Court hearings that took
place prior to his eventual termination from the program.” (R., p.160.)
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(R., p.161.) As the district court pointed out, the testimony presented at the post-conviction
evidentiary hearing did not help Macklin, and those same witnesses would have likely been called
to testify at a Rogers hearing.
Ms. McCaslin testified that Macklin lived in their home for two years, until her son, Wade,
died on June 17, 2018. (Tr., p.55, L.13-17; p.57, Ls.8-13; p.61, Ls11-13.) She did not recall that
Macklin lived at her son’s home. (Tr., p.62, Ls.9-11.) Ms. McCaslin said her son, Wade, “drank
beer nearly every day[,]” and she drank cheap beer and vodka – kept in her kitchen cupboard – on
a daily basis. (Tr., p.59, Ls.6-23; p.63, Ls.1-6.) Ms. McCaslin testified that she had never seen
Macklin “take a drink.” (Tr., p.55, Ls.10-12.) According to Ms. McCaslin, there were firearms in
her house, but they were kept in a locked safe in the basement. (Tr., p.53, Ls.8-14.) However,
after a visit from Macklin’s probation officer, the McCaslins removed the guns from the premises.
(Tr., p.55, Ls.4-9.) Mr. McCaslin testified that his and his wife’s home was on the same property
as their son’s home – about 50 feet apart. (Tr., p. 72, Ls.9-13.) Macklin kept his “stuff” at Mr.
McCaslin’s house, but he would “kind of go[] back and forth between the two homes” regularly.
(Tr., p.72, Ls.6-13.)
Tammy Park, a certified drug and alcohol counselor for Twin Falls Treatment and
Recovery Clinic (“TARC”) was a group leader and primary counselor for Macklin in the first half
of 2018. (Tr., p.12, L.9 – p.13, L.16.) TARC was a treatment provider for the Twin Falls Drug
Court. (Tr., p.13, Ls.1-3.) According to Ms. Park, Macklin “never came out and said . . . that
[Wade McCaslin] was a substance abuser” (Tr., p.15, Ls.4-11), he failed to do his homework on
one occasion (Tr., p.31, Ls.3-16), he was late to an individual session (Tr., p.33, Ls.7-17), and he
failed to seek approval before moving into Wade McCaslin’s parents’ home (Tr., p.33, L.21 – p.34,
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L.19). Ms. Park got the sense that Macklin was not complying with the terms of drug court. (Tr.,
p.35, Ls.4-18.) Ms. Park’s testimony would not have helped Macklin prevail at a Rogers hearing.
Melissa Andrusko, who facilitated a TARC group in which Macklin participated, testified
that she and the group had concerns about Macklin, resulting in the group advising him, “Hey, you
might want to follow these protocols of what drug court requests. Because if not, there are
consequences. You can get terminated. You don’t want to do that.” (Tr., p.41, Ls.12-21 p.43,
L.15 – p.44, L.2.) Julie Taylor did not have any direct supervision of Macklin, and was merely
assigned to write his probation violation for being terminated from drug court based on information
she received from others. (Tr., p.75, L.19 – p.77, L.4.) Neither Ms. Andrusko nor Ms. Park would
have offered any testimony at a Rogers hearing that would have aided Macklin’s cause.
Jeremy Ajeti supervised Macklin in felony Drug Court in 2018, and testified that after he
investigated the home of Macklin’s business partner’s elderly parents, the McCaslins, the Drug
Court judge gave Macklin permission to live there. (Tr., p.89, L.13 - p.90, L.19.) During his first
home visit, Mr. Ajeti informed the McCaslins about the rules of Probation and Parole, and “they
said that there was no firearms, no drugs usage in the residence.” (Tr., p.91, Ls.10-21 (verbatim).)
Mr. Ajeti subsequently learned there were firearms in the McCaslin’s home during another home
visit, when Mr. McCaslin took him to the basement (presumably) to show him the firearms. (Tr.,
p.90, L.21 – p.91, L.9.) Mr. Ajeti gave Macklin permission to stay in the McCaslin residence until
he found a new residence, but in the meantime, Macklin was terminated from Drug Court. (Tr.,
p.91, L.22 – p.93, L.21.) Macklin never told Mr. Ajeti that he was rotating between living in Wade
McCaslin’s house and Wade’s parents’ house; Macklin misled his probation officer because Mr.
Ajeti had only looked into the parents’ home – not Wade’s home. (Tr. p.100, L.17 – p. 101, L.2.)
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Mr. Ajeti testified that Macklin did not inform him that Wade McCaslin was abusing
prescription drugs until Wade died from a drug overdose. (Tr., p.94, Ls.14-19.) Mr. Ajeti did not
give Macklin permission to go travel to American Falls (to go fishing), and, although he would
have supported such travel, Macklin “would have to get approval from the drug court judge due to
American Falls is out of district.” (Tr., p.94, L.20 - p.95, L.1.) Macklin did not get such
permission. (Tr., p.102, L.10 - p.103, L.4.) In sum, Mr. Ajeti felt that Macklin was dishonest in
a variety of ways, and that he violated the terms of Drug Court. (Tr., p.104, L.23 – p.105, L.12.)
Mr. Ajeti recommended that Macklin be terminated from Drug Court, which, needless to say,
would not have benefitted Macklin in a Rogers hearing. (Tr., p.97, Ls.6-8.)
Finally, Israel Enriquez, the Coordinator of the Fifth Judicial District Felony Drug Court,
testified that the Drug Court team unanimously decided to terminate Macklin because he was
dishonest and could not comply with conditions that the Drug Court deemed easy. (Tr., p.154,
L.16 – p. 155, L.3; p.157, L.17 - p.158, L.14.) Mr. Enriquez detailed the requirements of the Drug
Court contract signed by Macklin, interwoven with how Macklin had specifically failed to comply
with the condition of the contract. (See generally Tr., p.162, L.14 – p.167, L.17.)
Mr. Enriquez said that the team members had concerns regarding “his associations
regarding a business partner of his that had . . . fatally overdosed[,]” Macklin’s misrepresentation
to the Drug Court about his living situation, reports that there was alcohol and firearms in the
house, and “concerns regarding the dishonesty, along with his unauthorized travel out of district.”
(Tr., p.157, L.20 – p.158, L.4.) Mr. Enriquez explained that “in drug court . . . we focus heavily
on honesty, on communication[,]” and that “these were issues that the team felt were – were easy
– were easy issues to – had Mr. Maclin done his part and communicated with the team openly and
honestly, we wouldn’t be having those difficult discussions that we do when it comes to
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termination.” (Tr., p.158, Ls.6-14.) Mr. Enriquez queried, “if you can’t do the easy things, how
is he ever going to do the hard thing, which is achieve long-term recovery, which is the goal[,]”
and the team collectively determined he was not going to be able to do that. (Tr., 159, Ls.4-10.)
Mr. Enriquez further testified that residing in a home where there is alcohol could certainly
be grounds for termination from Drug Court, that he was unaware that Macklin was “rotating
between two different residences,” and that Macklin had not obtained written permission from him
to travel out of district to go fishing. (Tr., p.161, Ls.5-11; p.166, Ls.7-13.) Mr. Enriquez explained
that Macklin’s assertion that he did not know that he would be traveling outside the judicial district
“is not an excuse for violating rules, period.” (Tr., p.166, Ls.14-21.) When Mr. Enriquez was
asked to summarize the reasons Macklin was terminated, he explained:
Mr. Macklin was in our program for 24 – for 24 weeks, which is a substantial
amount of time. We expect to see the – their engagement start to kick in right
between week 12 and 16 and really following along with drug court’s requirements,
not doing their own program, not doing, you know, the – the defendant’s own
program. They’re doing it the right way as instructed and asked for by drug court.
And, you know, in terms of his treatment participation, there didn’t seem to
be any issue with that. He seemed to be progressing pretty well in treatment, but
the issue was being able to master those skills that he’s learned in treatment and
applying them in his everyday life.
You know, at that point, 24 weeks, not communicating openly and honestly
with the team, minimizing your – or claiming ignorance for his rule violations,
certainly, that wasn’t – that was a major concern for many of the team members.
And when those concerns were brought to the team at staffing,
recommendations were made for termination, and ultimately Judge Wildman made
the independent decision to terminate him.
(Tr., p.169, L.8 - p.170, L.4.) After 24 weeks, Macklin wore out his welcome with the Drug Court
team by his dishonesty and claims of ignorance concerning the rules.
Even assuming Mr. Brown’s performance was deficient for not requesting a Rogers
hearing, Macklin has failed to show that such performance resulted in prejudice under Strickland.
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There is no indication that any of the witnesses that testified at the evidentiary hearing, and who
likely would have testified at a Rogers hearing, would have supported Macklin’s challenge to his
termination from Drug Court. As the district court concluded, “it is clear to this Court that had
Macklin been provided an opportunity to have a Rogers hearing, and had he called the witnesses
provided, he would not have been able to disprove the alleged rule violations; rather, the testimony
provided would have at best, provided an explanation or excuse for Macklin’s conduct that formed
the basis of the alleged rule violations.” (R., p.162.)
Macklin has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient
performance, the outcome of the proceeding – the revocation of his probation based on his
termination from Drug Court – would have been different. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.
86, 104 (2011); see
also -Wolf
- --- - -v.
- -State,
- - - 152 Idaho 64, 67-68, 266 P.3d 1169, 1172-1173 (Ct. App.
2011) (re: not ineffective for failing to file a meritless motion).
II.
Macklin Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred By Ruling That What Macklin
Learned In Drug Court Was Not Relevant To His Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim
A.

Introduction
On appeal, Macklin argues that the district court “erred as a matter of law in concluding

[his] testimony regarding what he learned in drug court was not relevant[6] to his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Appellant’s brief, p.12.) Macklin’s argument fails.

6

Under I.R.E. 401, evidence is relevant if: “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining
the action.”
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B.

Standard Of Review
Actions for post-conviction relief are governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure

because they are civil in nature. Ward v. State, 166 Idaho 330, ___, 458 P.3d 199, 201 (2020)
(citing Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 470, 903 P.2d 58, 59 (1995)). Relevant evidence is
“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
I.R.E. 401. Relevant evidence is generally admissible. I.R.E. 402. “This Court exercises free
review over a trial court’s determination of the relevance of testimony.” Orthman v. Idaho Power
Co., 134 Idaho 598, 602, 7 P.3d 207, 211 (2000).
C.

Macklin Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court’s Evidentiary Ruling
During the evidentiary hearing, the following dialogue occurred while Macklin was being

questioned by his counsel:
[COUNSEL]: All right. What did you learn from drug court?
A. I learned a lot. When I – when I started in Men’s Recovery with Vince, it was
all about the role play of man, what man –
[COUNSEL]: Objection. Relevance.
THE COURT: Sustained.
THE WITNESS: What did I learn?
THE COURT: No, the question – the proceeding here is about whether or not
you’re entitled to some type of post-conviction relief, not what you had learned
from drug court. So sustained.
(Tr., p.137, L.21 – p.138, L.6.)
On appeal, Macklin contends that what he learned in drug court “was certainly relevant to
his legal theory of ineffective assistance of counsel, as the fact that he learned a lot supported his
17

argument that his attorney should have requested a Rogers hearing, and that there was a reasonable
probability that the hearing would have been successful, meaning he would have been allowed to
continue in drug court.” (Appellant’s brief, p.13.)
However, Macklin does not explain how what he learned in Drug Court “supported his
argument” or was relevant to the issue to be decided at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing –
whether his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a Rogers hearing. Macklin was not
terminated from Drug Court for failing to learn about his addiction or the detrimental effects of
illegal drugs on society, but rather, for being dishonest, failing to comply with the rules, and for
offering excuses for rule violations (such as ignorance) that were not tolerable to the Drug Court
team. Therefore, whatever Macklin may have learned in Drug Court was not relevant to the
proceeding, and the district court properly excluded such testimony under I.R.E. 401.
“Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless the
ruling is a manifest abuse of the trial court’s discretion and a substantial right of the party is
affected.” Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 127 Idaho 565, 574, 903 P.2d 730, 739 (1995)
(citing I.R.E. 103; I.R.C.P. 61). Even if there was some relevance to what Macklin learned during
Drug Court, given the testimony of the evidentiary hearing witnesses about Macklin’s dishonesty,
non-compliance with rules, and weak excuses for violating them, the addition of testimony about
what Macklin learned during Drug Court could not have created a reasonable probability that his
counsel’s performance was either deficient or prejudicial under Strickland. In turn, any error in
the district court’s exclusion of such testimony at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing could
not have affected any of Macklin’s substantial rights.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order denying
Macklin’s petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 5th day of April, 2021.

/s/ John C. McKinney
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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/s/ John C. McKinney
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Deputy Attorney General
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
ROBERT SCOTT MACKLIN,
Case No. CV42-19-2532
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
DENYING PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant.

The Petitioner, Robert Scott Macklin's, Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
came before the Court for an evidentiary hearing on May 8, 2020. The Petitioner was represented
by Adam J. Ondo of Hilverda & McRae, PLLC. The State of Idaho was represented by Keil
Willmore, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Twin Falls County, Idaho.

Petitioner's counsel

requested additional time to file post hearing memoranda to help clarify the issues and evidence
presented for the Court. That Post-Evidentiary Brief was filed with the Court and the matter was
taken under advisement on May 15, 2020.
This court has reviewed the Amended Petition, the memoranda filed, as well as the
underlying criminal case file in Twin Falls County case CR-2014-7737. The court has also
considered the testimony presented at the May 8, 2020 hearing and the argument of counsel.
Being fully advised, the Court's findings of fact, conclusions of law and decision on the postconviction issues raised are articulated below.
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GOVERNING STANDARD
In his Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Macklin raised three (3)
issues, each of which is based upon allegations that his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance when helping defend him against the charges filed in his underlying criminal case. At
the evidentiary hearing held on May 8, 2020, the Petitioner's counsel voluntarily withdrew one
of the issues (count three).
"The right to counsel in criminal actions brought by the state of Idaho is guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho
State Constitution." Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 164, 321 P.3d 709, 714 (2014) (quoting
Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617, 262 P.3d 255, 260 (2011)). The courts utilize the Strickland

two-prong test to determine whether a defendant in a criminal case received effective assistance
of counsel. See State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 383, 313 P.3d 1, 39 (2013) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)); see also State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 306, 986 P.2d

323, 329 (1999). To establish deficient performance, "the defendant must show that counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
To demonstrate prejudice, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is defined as "a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome." Id. "The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just
conceivable." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011).
The defendant also must overcome a strong presumption "that counsel made all
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Cullen v. Pinholster,
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563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). "A fair assessment of attorney
performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
counsel's perspective at the time." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Thus, strategic decisions are
"virtually unchallengeable" if made after a "thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to
plausible options." Id. at 690.
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a civil, rather than criminal, proceeding,
governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437,443, 180 P.3d
476, 482 (2008); see also Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008). Like
the plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of evidence the
allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. I.C. § 19-4907; Stuart v.
State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271,
61 P .3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002).
Our appellate courts recognize that a defendant in a criminal case has a right to the
effective assistance of counsel under both the federal and the Idaho Constitutions. See Gibson v.
State, 110 Idaho 631, 634-35, 718 P.2d 283, 286-287 (1986). In order to prevail on a claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-conviction applicant must demonstrate both that his
attorney's performance was deficient, and that he was thereby prejudiced in the defense of the
criminal case. Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 145, 139 P.3d 741, 747 (Ct. App. 2006).
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, the United States Supreme Court
comprehensively discussed the right to the effective assistance of counsel and the appropriate
standard for judging a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The United States Supreme
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Court recognized a two-prong test that a criminal defendant asserting a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel must satisfy. First, the defendant must show that his counsel's performance
was deficient and, secondly, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. To show
deficient performance, a defendant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel's
performance was adequate by demonstrating "that counsel's representation did not meet
objective standards of competence." Murphy, 143 Idaho at 145, 139 P.3d at 747, (citing Roman,
125 Idaho at 648-49, 873 P.2d at 902-03). If a defendant succeeds in establishing that counsel's
performance was deficient, he must also prove the prejudice element by showing that "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). "A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. The benchmark for judging a
claim of ineffectiveness is "whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of
the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." Id.
At an evidentiary hearing all evidence must be offered and admitted to be considered.
Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933, 120 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 2005). The Idaho Rules of Evidence
apply to proceedings under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act (UPCP A), with the
exceptions noted in LC. § 19-4907. See I.R.E. 101(d)(4). The Petitioner is required to prove
allegations at the hearing by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
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ANALYSIS

In his Amended Petition For Post-Conviction Relief, Macklin requests his admission to
violating probation be withdrawn; that he be granted a Rogers hearing to contest being
terminated from Drug Court; and that the Disposition Judgment revoking his probation and
imposing his sentence be vacated.
The Court will address the two (2) allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel which
Macklin advanced at the evidentiary hearing held on May 8, 2020.
1. Did Trial Counsel's Failure to Request a Rogers Hearing to Contest Petitioner's

Termination From Drug Court Constitute Ineffective Assistance of Counsel?

Macklin claims that his attorney provided him ineffective assistance of counsel when he
failed to request a Rogers hearing to contest his termination from Drug Court. Macklin believes a
Rogers hearing would have provided him with an opportunity to refute the five alleged rule

violations which caused him to be terminated from the Twin Falls Drug Court program.
In Rogers, the Idaho Supreme Court held that drug court termination proceedings
required the same restricted due process protections provided to parolees and probationers. State
v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738, 170 P.3d 881 (2007). Due process required for termination of drug

court participation is to be flexible, does not need to be equated to a separate criminal
prosecution and may be informal, on the condition that the safeguards are provided. Id. The
presiding judge in a Drug Court termination proceeding may consider evidence which might not
necessarily be admissible in a criminal trial, if such evidence is disclosed prior to the hearing, is
reliable and would assist the court in making its determination. Id.
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In this case, the Drug Court termination hearing was informal because Macklin was
terminated from the specialty court program during one of the weekly Drug Court meetings.
Macklin's due process rights were sufficiently safeguarded because he was represented by
counsel at the time and he was given the opportunity to refute and/or explain each alleged rule
violation during each of the weekly Drug Court hearings that took place prior to his eventual
termination from the program. See Generally Drug Court Transcript in CR-2014-7737. Judge
Wildman terminated Macklin from the Twin Falls Drug Court program on July 18, 2018 during
the regularly scheduled weekly Drug Court meeting. The formal order of termination was
entered on July 19, 2018.
At the time of his termination from the Drug Court program, Macklin was represented by
the Twin Falls County Public Defender's office. A conflict Public Defender (Dan Brown) was
appointed to replace the Twin Falls County Public Defender's office on October 11, 2018.
In the current Post-Conviction proceeding, Macklin claims that attorney Dan Brown was
ineffective because he failed to request a Rogers hearing to dispute the alleged Drug Court rule
violations and Macklin's eventual termination from the Drug Court program.

The Court

specifically notes that Brown did not substitute in and become Macklin's attorney until October
11, 2018 - some four months after Macklin had been terminated from the program for the
alleged rule violations to which Macklin had already admitted.
At the May 8, 2020 evidentiary hearing on Macklin's PCR Petition, Mr. Brown testified
that after he took over the case, he decided not to challenge Macklin's termination from Drug
Court because he didn't believe such a challenge would be unsuccessful. Not only had Macklin
already admitted that he violated the Drug Court's rules on the record, but Brown's overall
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review of Macklin's file convinced him that attempting to challenge his dismissal from the
specialty court months after the fact would be fruitless.

After reviewing the file, Brown

conferred with Macklin and decided to forego requesting a Rogers hearing.

The Court is

convinced that Brown made a strategic decision only after conferring with Macklin.
As such, this Court cannot find that Brown's representation fell below objective
standards of competence and Macklin's current claim that Brown was ineffective because he
failed to request a Rogers hearing does not pass the first prong of the Strickland test.
Assuming for argument's sake only that Mr. Brown's decision to forego requesting a
Rogers hearing did constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, Macklin's claim on this issue still

fails the second prong of the Strickland test because this Court is not convinced the result would
have been any different had such a hearing been requested.
The witnesses who Macklin claims might have been able to help him dispute the alleged
Drug Court rule violations at a Rogers hearing are the same witnesses he called to testify at the
May 8, 2020 evidentiary hearing in this PCR matter. Their testimony confirmed that Macklin
was violating the rules of the Drug Court program as alleged. He was living in more than one
home on the same property, bouncing back and forth between them, without the permission of
his Probation Officer. Likewise, it is clear from the witness testimony that he was residing in a
home where alcohol and firearms were located (notwithstanding the explanation that the items
were locked in safe); and he was clearly associating with a person who was abusing prescription
drugs (Wade Mccaslin), regardless of the fact Mr. Mccaslin might have had a prescription to
possess those substances legally. (Sadly, Wade McCaslin overdosed on those prescription drugs).
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Therefore, it is clear to this Court that had Macklin been provided an opportunity to have
a Rogers hearing, and had he called the witnesses provided, he would not have been able to
disprove the alleged rule violations; rather, the testimony provided would have at best, provided
an explanation or excuse for Macklin's conduct that formed the basis of the alleged rule
violations.
As such, and having considered everything presented in this matter, this Court is
convinced that had Macklin been given the opportunity to present evidence and testimony at a
Rogers hearing, he would have still been terminated from the Drug Court program. As such,

Macklin has also failed to meet his burden of proof on the second prong of the Strickland test
and show how Brown's failure to request a Rogers hearing prejudiced him.

2. Did Attorney Brown's Alleged Failure to Conduct an Investigation into Any
Mitigating Factors Constitute Ineffective Assistance of Counsel?
Petitioner next claims that Mr. Brown's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness that should be expected from his attorney when Brown failed to properly
investigate possible mitigating factors for Macklin's conduct. Macklin claims Brown's failure to
fully investigate prejudiced him because it caused Mr. Brown to advise against fighting the Drug
Court termination and his probation violations in the District Court.

Specifically, Macklin

claims that had Mr. Brown properly investigated the facts or called witnesses at a Rogers
hearing, or at his probation violation disposition hearing in the District Court, he would have
been able to "partially refute" some of the allegations contained in the State's Ex Parte Motion to
Revoke Probation. Macklin contends that providing witnesses who might partially refute the

alleged rule violations (or put another way, explain why he violated the drug court rules) would
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have prevented him from being terminated from the Drug Court program and thus, it would have
also prevented him from being in violation of his probation. The Petitioner's arguments do not
carry any water.
As set forth above, Macklin had already admitted to the Drug Court team that he was in
violation of the Drug Court rules prior to Brown ever being appointed to represent him. Macklin
had admitted that he lived in a residence which contained alcohol and firearms; that he left the 5th
district without written permission when he drove to American Falls to float the Snake River and
fish; that he lived with an individual (Wade McCaslin) who abused pain killers; 1 and that he had
been dishonest with the Drug Court staff by not fully disclosing all of these situations. 2
All of these rule violations, combined with the Drug Court treatment team's consensus
that Macklin was not being fully honest with them (See PO Ajeti's testimony on May 8, 2020),
formed the basis for Macklin's termination from the Drug Court Program.
At the May 8, 2020 evidentiary hearing, Macklin verified that the answers he provided
the Court during the November 20, 2018 admit/deny hearing in the Twin Falls District Court
were true and correct. 3 This included an acknowledgement that he felt he had been "rightfully
terminated" from the Drug Court program and that the underlying Drug Court rule violations
were true.
1 Whether the Petitioner's roommate had a prescription for the pain killers he was abusing and ultimately overdosed
on is not relevant to whether such behavior posed a risk to Petitioner's future recovery and success in the Drug
Court Program. See Petitioner's Post-Evidentiary Brief p. 9.
2 In his brief and at the evidentiary hearing, Petitioner counsel mischaracterized the nature of the essay Petitioner
was required to write in regards to his continued dishonesty with the Drug Court staff. Judge Wildman required
Macklin to write an essay "on the importance of honesty in recovery." Drug Court Transcript p. 13, 11. 3. Macklin
took it upon himself to explain the manner in which he had previously been dishonest with the Drug Court staff
when writing his essay.
3 At the evidentiary hearing, the Petitioner initially attempted to claim that Mr. Brown had instructed him to lie
under oath and that his admissions to the probation violations were untrue. When pressed however, he reaffirmed
that the admissions he made under oath at the admit/deny hearing were true and correct. Based upon this colloquy,
this Court finds that Mr. Macklin's testimony regarding Mr. Brown's alleged deficient performance is not credible.
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The witnesses Macklin identified in his Post-Evidentiary Brief include the people who
testified in the May 8, 2020 PCR hearing.

As previously set forth above, their testimony

confirmed for this Court that Macklin was in violation of the Drug Court rules as alleged. Mrs.
Linda Mccaslin testified that Macklin resided in her home at times and in her son's (Wade's)
home at other times. This testimony confirmed that Macklin had not been entirely honest with
the Drug Court staff about his living arrangements. Mrs. Mccaslin also confirmed that she had
firearms and alcohol in her home. Doc Mccaslin verified that Macklin accompanied him to
American Falls to float the Snake River and fish, testimony that clearly shows Macklin left the
5th district without his PO's advance permission. Additionally, the testimony provided by Ms.
Park and Ms. Andrushko indicated that he was amendable to and participating in treatment,
however, their testimony did not help dispute Macklin's alleged Drug Court rule violations.
Overall, none of the testimony presented during the May 8, 2020 evidentiary hearing refuted the
alleged Drug Court rule violations which formed the basis for Macklin's termination from Drug
Court, and the eventual violation of his District Court probation.
As such, and because these are the same witnesses Brown could have called to testify at a
Rogers hearing, this Court concludes that even if Mr. Brown had fully investigated the issues and

interviewed these witnesses before requesting a Rogers hearing as Macklin wanted, the result
would have been the same. Macklin would have still been terminated from the Drug Court
program, and he would have still been found to be in violation of his District Court probation for
having been terminated from the Drug Court program. 4

4 In his brief, Petitioner's counsel alleges "it is apparent that Mr. Macklin was doing well in drug court until his
business partner and friend passed away, at which time the drug court team decided to target him for punishment
rather than offer him the support he needed." Petitioner's Post-Evidentiary Brief p. 10. This allegation of 'targeting'
is not supported by the record or the testimony presented. In fact, the Drug Court hearing transcripts indicate that the
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CONCLUSION

For all the reasons set forth above, this Court concludes that the Petitioner has not met his
burden of proof under the Strickland test for either of the two (2) counts of alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel against Mr. Brown.

First, Macklin has not convinced this Court that Mr.

Brown was deficient or that his representation of Macklin's interests fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness to be expected from legal counsel under the circumstances.
Secondly, Macklin has not presented sufficient evidence to convince this Court that he
was prejudiced by Mr. Brown's alleged ineffective conduct or alleged professional errors.
This Court is not convinced that the result of Macklin's underlying criminal proceeding
would have been any different had Brown requested a Rogers hearing or if he had presented
witnesses at the District Court probation disposition hearing.
Based on the foregoing law and analysis, and for all the reasons set forth above,
Macklin's Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is DENIED.

DATED:

Signed: 6/18/2020 03:42 PM

Roger B. Harris
District Judge

drug court staff team reached out and attempted to help Mr. Macklin deal with his friend's death while maintaining
his sobriety. In addition, PO Israel Enriquez testified that the entire drug court staff/team had concerns about
Macklin's honesty and inability to follow the Drug Court rules for quite some time before he was actually
terminated from the program.
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I, J ackee Petersen, do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
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Grant Loebs
Twin Falls County Prosecutor
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Inbox.pros@co.twin-falls.id. us

AdamJ. Ondo
Defense Counsel

Emailed to:
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Twin Falls County Sheriff

Emailed to:
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Fifth District Probation & Parole

Emailed to:
Dist5@idoc.idaho.gov

Idaho Department of Corrections
Central Records
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Kristina Glascock
Clerk of the District Court
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